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RIGHT OF MEMBER TO INSPECT TRADE UNIONS' FINANCIAL

RECORDS

If one were to approach a group of union members and put to them this question, "Do you, by virtue of your membership in the union, have a right to inspect
its financial records?", the replies would contain both affirmative and negative
answers. Some of the comments would include statements to this effect-"I never
gave it much thought," "I couldn't understand the records even if I saw them,"
or "Who needs to look at the records when the union publishes financial statements?" From such replies in this imagined situation, it can be discerned that such
a question is worthy of thought.
The California Supreme Court has answered the question posed above in the
affirmative by their decision in Mooney v. Bartenders Union Local 284,1 which
is the only California decision to date which puts this question squarely in issue.
In so doing, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court which had been
2
reversed by the District Court of Appeals.
The facts of the case are as follows: The union is an unincorporated association affiliated with the Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union. Quarterly statements of its finances prepared by a certified public
accountant were available to its members. For several months prior to July 1955,
the statements showed that expenditures exceeded income, and there was no detailed explanation as to certain large outlays. Mooney, a member of the union and
plaintiff in the proceeding, demanded an itemized accounting of all income and
expenses of the union from June 1, 1947, to January 5, 1955, and requested permission to examine all financial records of the union covering that period. The
demand was refused by the secretary, who had control of the records, and his
action was upheld by the executive board of the union.
One of the principal questions presented on appeal was whether Mooney was
required to exhaust the administrative remedies within the union before he could
obtain judicial relief. Provisions in union constitutions requiring the exhaustion
of internal remedies are generally recognized by the courts as binding on the members. 3 Mooney, subsequent to the adverse decision of the local's president, took
all the required steps of internal appeal with the exception of an appeal to the
executive board of the International Union. The Supreme Court found that the
union constitution made no provision for an appeal from a denial of permission
to inspect the records, holding that this fact obviated further internal appeal and
entitled Mooney to seek relief from the courts.
The plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate 4 set forth that he was entitled to
examine the items in question "by virtue of membership in said union." 5 As a
general proposition, the proper function of mandamus is to compel inferior or subordinate courts and all others exercising public authority, such as elected public
officials and corporate organizations, to perform the duties imposed upon them
by applicable statutes in consequence of their official status. It is not available as
148 Cal.2d 851, 313 P.2d 857 (1957).
2 302 P.2d 866 (Cal.App. 1956).

3 Holderby v. Intl. Union Engrs., 45 Cal.2d 843, 291 P.2d 463 (1955) ; Lawson v. Hewell,
118 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763, 49 L.R.A. 400 (1897).
4 In California, the name "mandate" has been substituted for "mandamus" as the formal
title of the writ. Chrisman v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.App. 477, 219 Pac. 85 (1923).
5 302 Pac. at 867.
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a remedy between individuals to enforce purely private rights, and as a general
rule will not lie to compel the performance of purely contractual obligations. 6
The rights and duties of members of an unincorporated association as among
themselves or between them and the association are created by the organic law or
rules of the association and are of a private, rather than a public nature.7 For this
reason, it is generally recognized that mandamus will not lie against an unincorporated association or its officers.8 California courts have adopted a contrary view,
however, and take the position that mandamus is available against a trade union,
a species of unincorporated association, 9 to compel the performance of such duties
as are owed to the members, which are enumerated in the constitution and by-laws.
Mooney contended that he should be awarded either the same right as a partner under section 15019 of the California Corporations Code, or the right of a
shareholder of a corporation under section 3003 of the same code. Section 15019
provides that a partner has a right to inspect the books of the partnership.' 0 Section 3003 provides that corporate records shall be open to inspection upon the
written demand of any shareholder, at any reasonable time, for a purpose reasonably related to his interests as a shareholder." He claimed that a trade union has
some of the attributes of a partnership, or if not, attributes of a corporation which
would make at least one of the two statutes applicable.
The trial court found that the quarterly financial reports did not set forth sufficient detail with respect to the financial business of the union as to properly
advise each and every member of its.financial status. 12 The judgment of the trial
court recognized Mooney's clear legal right by directing that a writ of mandate
issue compelling the secretary to perform his duty and permit Mooney to inspect
all books of account, records, papers and documents of the union from July 1,
1947, to the date of the judgment.
The District Court of Appeals reversed on three basic grounds. First, the court
recognized that mandate is available against an unincorporated association, yet
declined to allow the application of such rule to the Mooney case. The court's
reason was that the rule with regard to mandate in its application to unincorporated associations developed in situations where, after being wrongfully expelled
and having exhausted the internal union remedies, the union member sought judicial relief. Expulsion from a union would seriously affect a workingman's very
livelihood. The court was of the opinion that denial of permission to inspect the
records was not of such serious consequence to merit.the issuance of a writ of
mandate.' 3 Secondly, the court held section 15019 inapplicable because a union
is not a partnership. Thirdly, a trade union is not a corporation. Section 3003 of
the California Corporations Code, which allows inspection of corporate records
by a shareholder, makes no mention of unincorporated associations. The court
reasoned that if the legislature intended to include such groups, it would have done
so specifically.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the District Court of Appeals and
6 34 Am. Jur., Mandamus § 91 (1941).

Id. §93.
8 Ibid.
9 Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 37 Cal.2d 134, 231 P.2d 6, 21 AL.R. 1387 (1951).
7

10 CAL. CORP.
1 Id. § 3003.

CODE § 15019.

12 302 P.2d at 868.

13 Id. at 869, 870.
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affirmed the judgment of the trial court, awarding plaintiff the writ he sought. In
reaching its decision, the Supreme Court relied heavily upon Otto v. Journeyman
Tailors' P. & B. Union.14
In the Otto case, a member had been expelled for an offense which, under the
union constitution and by-laws, was punishable only by a monetary fine. The
court stated the principle which has recently become accepted doctrine' 5 in circumstances where a court provides a remedy for a union member whose rights
have been denied:
"Courts will interfere for the purpose of protecting property rights of members of
unincorporated associations in all proper cases, and when they take jurisdiction, will
follow and enforce so far as applicable the rules applying to incorporated bodies of
the same character." 16

The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the writ of mandate issued by the
Superior Court commanding the union to reinstate Otto to membership in the
society.
The Supreme Court in the Mooney case did not expressly state the specific
reasons which justified a combination of the principle as stated in the Otto case
(courts will, in a proper case, apply corporate rules to unincorporated bodies of
the same character) with section 3003 of the California Corporations Code which
provides for inspection of corporate records by a shareholder. Nevertheless, the
court held that a member of an unincorporated labor union had a clear legal right
to inspect the financial records of the union. 17
No other cases have been found in which a union member sought to compel
the union to permit him to inspect the books and records of the organization.
However, there are cases from other jurisdictions which are closely related in that
they concern the financial management of trade unions.
In McNichols v. InternationalTypographical Union,'8 a federal case, a parent
trade union sought to abolish its district unions by amendment of the constitution
and by-laws. The members of the district unions, who for years had paid dues and
assessments, sought relief from the courts. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held, that as the parent union for years had received payments
from the members of the district unions, who had acquired thereby a property
right in the accumulated funds of the parent union as well as in those of their own
district union, the constitution could not be amended so as to abolish the district
union. The court stated:
"It is to the interest in these funds that we must look for the right of the court to
interfere in all the affairs of the unions." 19

The case is related to the Mooney case in that the members' property right in
the accumulated funds of the union is recognized as the basis for awarding relief.
The member cannot be deprived of such property right by the attempted action
of the union unless the union takes adequate precautions to preserve such rights,
14 75 Cal. 308, 17 Pac. 217, 7 Am. St. Rep. 156 (1888).
15 Zepeda v. International Hodcarriers' Union, Local 89, 143 CalApp.2d 609, 300 P.2d
251 (1956) ; De Monbrun v. Sheet Metal Workers, 140 CalApp.2d 546, 295 P.2d 881 (1956);
Oil Workers Union v. Superior Court, 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 230 P.2d 71 (1951).

16 75 Cal. at 313, 17 Pac. at 219.

17 48 Cal.2d at 854, 313 P.2d at 858.
Is 63 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1933).
19 Id. at 492.

Nov., 19571

NOTES

such as reimbursing the unexpended funds to the members prior to dissolution of
the district unions.
In Schrank v. Brown s the president of the International Association of Machinists ordered the suspension of the local president without charging an offense
punishable under the constitution and by-laws. The New York court found that
the local was in fact being disciplined for its criticism of the parent union. The
court compelled reinstatement of the illegally ousted president, holding that:
2
"Fair criticism is the right of members of a union as is the right of every citizen." 1

To fairly criticize, one must have valid information upon which to base his
conclusions of fact. It would appear then, that in order for such a right to be of
appreciable significance, a union member should be entitled access to a source of
information so that he may formulate clear, concise criticism. Access to the financial records coupled with the right to fairly criticize would enable the union member to better protect his property interest in the funds.
The decision of the Pennsylvania Court in O'Neill v. United Ass'n of Journeyman Plumbers & Steamfitters22 disclosed the following facts. Over a twelve-year
period, the parent union had installed officers without an election and had rendered no accounting to the members of the local for fees, dues, assessments and
other funds. O'Neill sued as president of the local, and a decree compelling defendant parent union to institute elections and render an accounting was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, stating that the primary objects of such
voluntary associations were the protection of the rights of the membersY2
The O'Neill case involved the mismanagement and concealment of financial
dealings on the part of the parent union. In this respect, the case is similar to the
Mooney case where the financial statements, though published, were not adequate
to apprise the members of the large unexplained outlays that had taken place.
The three decisions above seem to indicate a solidification of thought on the
subject of the growing importance of finance upon the internal affairs of the trade
union. California decisions are in accord, apparently recognizing that a new state
of affairs has arisen with regard to labor unions and their impact upon the state
economy.24
As early as 1917, the California Supreme Court recognized that section 3003
of the Corporations Code was capable of interpretative expansion as applied to
other than corporate organizations. In Musket v. Department of Public Service,25
a resident taxpayer of the City of Los Angeles asked for a writ of mandate to compel the defendant public utility, a municipal corporation, to exhibit its records.
He contended that he stood in the same relationship to the public utility as a
shareholder stood in relation to his corporation, and as such he should be awarded
a similar right of inspection as provided the shareholder in section 3003 of the
Corporations Code.
Although refusing plaintiff's request on the ground of lack of a beneficial interest, the court recognized that the analogy between the common law right of a
stockholder to inspect the corporate records and the right of a citizen to inspect
20 92 N.Y. Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S. 452 (1948).
2
1Id. at 84, 80 N.Y.S. at 455.
=348 Pa. 605, 36 A.2d 325 (1944).
2 Id. at 608, 36 A.2d at 328.
24 Oil Workers Union v. Superior Court, 103 CalApp.2d 512, 230 P.2d 71 (1951).
25 35 CaI.App. 630, 170 Pac. 653 (1917).
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the public records was "perfect." 26 The court realized that a new condition of
affairs, uncontemplated when the above common law rules were formulated, had
developed. Inspection of the records by a citizen will serve as a check upon dishonest public officials and be conducive to the betterment of the public service.27
Both the trade union and the public utility were in the stages of infancy when
the common law rules, used in the Musket case by plaintiff in his "perfect" analogy, were formulated. It is reasonable to assume that if section 3003 is applicable
to a public utility in a proper case, the same section is applicable to an unincorporated trade union, uncontemplated at the time of the formulation of the common
law rules stated above.
In De Monbrun v. Sheet Metal Workersns the president of the parent union
had taken possession of $280,000.00 in bonds and a bank account amounting to
$40,000.00 which belonged to the local. He refused to permit the trustees of the
local to examine financial statements, books, and records or to conduct an audit.
Upon proof of this flagrant mismanagement of union funds, the District Court
of Appeals issued an injunction to compel an accounting and other equitable relief,
stating that the members who would complain of the mismanagement of the funds
had no means of acquiring notice of such illegal practices by the president of the
parent union.29
Although not expressly stated, it can be fairly implied that the court recognized
the right of the member to fairly criticize, the same right as was definitely upheld
in the Schrank case. A growth in financial resources has taken place in trade unionism. From the decision in the De Monbrun case, it would appear that the members'
control is to be more extensive with regard to the application of such resources.
The California District Court of Appeals, in Oil Workers Union v. Superior
Court,3 0 held that a union was a person for the purposes of being sued under
section 388 of the California Code of Civil Procedure which provides that two or
more persons, who are associated in any business and transact such business in a
common name, may be sued by such common name.3 ' Sustaining the jurisdiction
of the trial court to hold the union in contempt, the District Court of Appeals
made known its reason for so holding.
"Each union has all of the aspects of an entity. Labor unions are no longer the small
unimportant organizations they were once considered. The labor union is a developing
institution and with its tremendous growth in importance and power has come to be
more akin to the corporation than the partnership or the social or fraternal order. This
being so, whenever it can be done without violation of some rule of law, the ends of
justice will be more properly served if the courts apply to such organizations the rules
applicable to corporations rather than the rules applicable to voluntary fraternal
orders or partnerships, at least at the procedural level and in respect to the conduct
of the business of a court and the enforcement of its legal orders."
"To consider such organizations under present day conditions as mere social or frater32
nal orders or partnerships is to close one's eyes to the realities now existing."

The Supreme Court, in the Mooney case, leaned as heavily upon the decision
in the Oil Workers case as they did in relying upon the principle stated in the Otto
26
27

Id. at 638, 170 Pac. at 656.
Ibid.

28
29 140 Cal.App.2d 546, 295 P.2d 881 (1956).
Id. at 560, 295 P.2d at 892.
30 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 230 P.2d 71 (1951).
31 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 388.
32 103 Cal.App.2d at 571, 230 P.2d at 106.

